S.S. Dewan, J.

1. The facts giving rise to this regular second appeal filed by the plaintiffs may be briefly stated as under :–

Sheoraj Singh, claiming himself to be the original owner of the suit land, sold an area of 13 Kanals-19 marlas as detailed in the plaint to Shyam Lal for Rs. 2000/-. The sale was sought to be preempted by Sultan and Hari Singh, plaintiffs appellant, claiming themselves to be the tenants over the suit land under the vendor and their claim was decreed by the trial Court. The lower Appellate Court, however, modified the decree for limiting the preemption to 1/6th share in the land measuring 2 kanals-3 marlas out of 13 kanals 19 marlas, with the proportionate sale-price. Sultan and Hari Singh have now come up in second appeal claiming that they are entitled to pre-emption of whole of the land sold.

2. The Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs confined his argument to the construction of Section 15 (1) (c) fourthly, Punjab Pre-emption Act which runs as follows :–

15. Persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in respect of sales of agriculture land and village immovable property.

(1) The right of pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and village immovable property shall vest;

(c) Where is sale the of land or property owned jointly or is made by all co-shares jointly, fourthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy of the vendors or any of them the land or property sold or a part thereof.

3. The Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs urged that on a proper construction of this provision, the tenants are entitled to pre-empt the whole of the land which is sold and he placed reliance on a Single Bench decision in Mangtu v. Tika Ram and others (1969) 71 P.L.R. 210 wherein it was observed as follows :–

The meaning of section 15(1) (c) Fourthly of the Punjab Preemption Act, is that the tenants who are entitled to Pre-emption must firstly be the tenants of the vendors, if there are more than one vendors they can be tenants of any one of them. They must be tenants of the land sold. Lastly, they may be tenants even of a part of the land sold. This also showed that a tenant of a part of the land sold can pre-empt the whole of the land sold. It is to be noted that sub-clause Fourthly is concerned only in describing the tenants who are entitled to preempt. It is not concerned in conferring a right of Pre-emption on them. On a survey of the scheme of the Act and particularly the scheme of Section 15(1) of the Act, it would appear that the principle embodied their is the well known principle that the pre-emptor must take the bargain of sale as a whole. Neither can he ask that the sale should be split nor can be compeled to accept a pre-emption of only a part of the land sold.

4. This controversy has already been set at rest by a Division Bench decision of this Court in R.S.A. No. 252 of 1963, Kartar Singh and others v. Kirpal Singh (1965) 67 P.L.R. 123 (S.N.) decided on May 21, 1965, wherein it was held that taking into consideration the object that was apparently in view of the legislature viz., to afford security of tenancy to the tenants and in view of the fact that it is well recognized that a person as a right can exercise his right of pre-emotion only over that part of the property qua which he has a superior right of pre-emption, I have no hesitation in holding that the only proper interpretation of the clause in question is that although a tenant becomes qualified to bring a suit for Pre-emption as soon as he can establish that he holds right of tenancy over any portion of the land which forms part of the sale, his right to preempt extends only to the extent of the property over which he has the tenancy rights.

5. The lower Appellate Court after going into the evidence has found that the share of Sheoraj Singh vendor is 1/6th in kila Nos. 38/1 min and 10/1 and in such circumstances, the plaintiffs can be said to be the tenants under the vendors only to the extent of 1/6th share owned by him and not in respect of the remaining 5/6th shire owned by the other owners Relying on the decision in Kartar Singh and other case, (supra), the lower Appellate Court decreed the plaintiffs suit to the extent of 2 Kanals-3 Marias on payment of propionate price. There is no warrant for interference with the finding in second appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.

Sultan and Another v. Shaym Lal and Another